x belongs to W . The generalisation to a fuzzy subset occurs by permitting this degree to take more than two values, typically by allowing any value in [0, 1].
1 If G denotes a fuzzy subset of X and f G (x) = 1 then x clearly belongs to G, and if f G (x) = 0 then x clearly does not belong to G. In between there are various degrees of belonging.
A fuzzy (binary) relation F dened on a choice space X is characterised by a function f F : X × X → [0, 1]. If this relation represents an individual's (weak) preferences, then f F (x, y) can be interpreted as the degree to which this individual is condent that x is at least as good as y. This is not the only possible interpretation of f F (x, y); another is that it measures the intensity of an individual's belief, or how true they regard the proposition x is at least as good as y.
For a fuzzy relation to count as a representation of preferences, it must satisfy certain criteria.
2 One is reexivity, f F (x, x) = 1 for all x ∈ X. Another is connectedness, f F (x, y) = 0 implies f F (y, x) = 1 for all x, y ∈ X.
The most dicult condition to formulate is transitivity. There are many possible ways to model the transitivity of a fuzzy binary relation. Any condition is legitimate provided that it satises the weak constraint that, for all x, y, z ∈ X, f F (x, y) = 1 and f F (y, z) = 1 implies f F (x, z) = 1. For example, this condition is met by the familiar max-min transitivity condition f F (x, z) ≥ min {f F (x, y), f F (y, z)}, and also by the Lukasiewicz transitivity condition f F (x, z) ≥ f F (x, y) + f F (y, z) − 1.
Arguably the most general way of expressing the transitivity property is to assume a form of transitivity called max-star transitivity. If is a binary operation on [0, 1] then this condition says that f F (x, z) ≥ f F (x, y) f F (y, z).
The star operator in this formulation is commonly taken to be a triangular
the following conditions are satised, 2 A sample of the literature on fuzzy preferences is Orlovsky (1978) , Ovchinnikov (1981) , Basu (1984) , Billot (1995) , Dutta, Panda, Pattanaik (1986), Dutta (1987) , Jain (1990) , Ponsard (1990) , Dasgupta and Deb (1991 , 1996 ), Roubens (1991, 1992) and Banerjee (1993 Banerjee ( , 1994 . The philosophical underpinnings of these ideas are discussed in Piggins and Salles (2007) .
3 Klement, Mesiar and Pap (2000) is a detailed account of triangular norms.
(iv) T (x, 1) = x.
Throughout this paper we use the notation x y and T (x, y) interchangeably.
It is easy to see that max-min transitivity and Lukasiewicz transitivity are particular max-star transitive relations. There are innitely many others. Of course, some valid transitivity conditions are not max-star transitive
Max-min transitivity possesses a technical property that is not shared by Lukasiewicz transitivity. It contains no zero divisor. A triangular norm T contains no zero divisor if and only if for all x, y ∈ (0, 1),
, y = 1 2 and so this norm contains a zero divisor. This condition is central to this paper.
Social choice
This paper is a contribution to the literature on social choice with fuzzy preferences. A comprehensive survey of the literature is Salles (1998). 4 The literature has been motivated by the idea that fuzziness can have a smoothing eect on preference aggregation and so perhaps the famous impossibility results of Arrow (1951) and others can be avoided.
5
The literature typically focuses on criteria that imply that preference aggregation must be undemocratic in some sense. These results are akin to Arrow's impossibility theorem. In these papers the relevant conditions are sucient conditions; if an aggregation rule satises them then it implies that there must be an undesirable concentration of power in society. Our approach is dierent, we identify both a necessary and sucient condition for preference aggregation to be undemocratic in a particular sense. More specically, we show that an aggregation rule satisfying certain criteria is dictatorial if and only if the triangular norm used in the formulation of the transitivity condition has no zero divisor. A consequence of this result is that Sen (1970) . Note that an exact preference is a fuzzy preference f F (x, y) such that f F (x, y) ∈ {0, 1} for all x, y ∈ X. A vague preference is a fuzzy preference f F (x, y) such that f F (x, y) / ∈ {0, 1} for some x, y ∈ X.
max-min transitivity leads to dictatorship, whereas Lukasiewicz transitivity does not.
An equivalent way of putting the matter is this. Restricting attention to aggregation rules that satisfy counterparts of unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives, we characterise the set of max-star transitive relations that permit preference aggregation to be non-dictatorial. This set contains all and only those triangular norms that contain a zero divisor.
Preliminaries
X is a set of social alternatives with #X ≥ 3. N = {1, ..., n} with n ≥ 2 is a nite set of individuals.
A fuzzy binary relation (FBR) over X is a function f :
S is the set of all FBRs over X. H is the set of all r ∈ S satisfying the conditions (i) for all x ∈ X, r(x, x) = 1, (ii) for all x, y ∈ X, r(x, y) = 0 implies r(y, x) = 1, (iii) for all x, y, z ∈ X, r(x, z) ≥ r(x, y) r(y, z) where is a triangular norm.
The FBRs in H will be interpreted as fuzzy weak preference relations.
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A fuzzy aggregation rule (FAR) is a function Φ : H n → H. We write r = Φ(r 1 , ..., r n ), r = Φ(r 1 , ..., r n ) and so on (where Φ is the FAR). We write r(x, y) to denote the restriction of r to (x, y), and r (x, y) to denote the restriction of r to (x, y) and so on.
Φ is independent (I) if and only if, for all (r 1 , ..., r n ), (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ H n and all x, y ∈ X, r j (x, y) = r j (x, y) for all j ∈ N implies r(x, y) = r (x, y).
Φ is unanimous (U) if and only if, for all (r 1 , . . . , r n ) ∈ H n , all x, y ∈ X and
Φ is neutral if and only if, for all (r 1 , ..., r n ), (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ H n and all x, y, z, w ∈ X, r j (x, y) = r j (z, w) for all j ∈ N implies r(x, y) = r (z, w).
6 It is possible to factor out of a fuzzy weak preference relation a fuzzy strict preference relation, and a fuzzy indierence relation. There are several ways of doing this (Dasgupta and Deb, 2001 ). However, this issue does not arise in this paper. Our theorem requires the fuzzy weak preference relation only. Moreover, we adopt the philosophical position that indierence is not a vague concept. It is perhaps more natural to think of preferences as being vague when neither exact strict preference nor exact indierence exist, and in these cases no degree of preference or degree of indierence is dened. For this reason, we prefer to work with the fuzzy weak preference relation as a primitive.
Φ is dictatorial if and only if there exists an individual i ∈ N such that for all x, y ∈ X, and for every (r 1 , . . . , r n ) ∈ H n , r i (x, y) = r(x, y).
I is stronger than the condition commonly used in the literature, but it can be shown to follow from the requirement that a non-constant FAR cannot be manipulated.
7 The same is true for U, which is stronger than the requirement that the FAR is compensative.
8 Our dictatorship condition is strong too, but it is important to characterise when dictatorship in this strong sense arises. This is what we accomplish in this paper.
Theorem
Theorem. If has no zero divisor then any FAR satisfying I and U is dictatorial. Moreover, if has a zero divisor then a non-dictatorial FAR exists that satises I and U.
We rst prove suciency. The following lemma holds for any triangular norm.
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Lemma 1. Any FAR satisfying I and U is neutral under any triangular norm.
Proof. Let Φ be an FAR. Case 1: If (a, b) = (c, d) then the result follows immediately from the fact that Φ is I.
Case 2: (a, b), (a, c) ∈ X ×X. Take (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ H n such that r j (b, c) = 1 for all j ∈ N . U implies that r(b, c) = 1. Since r is max-star transitive, we have r(a, c) ≥ r(a, b). In addition, since r j (b, c) = 1 for all j ∈ N and individual preferences are max-star transitive, it follows that r j (a, c) ≥ r j (a, b) for all j ∈ N . Select a prole (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ H n such that r j (b, c) = 1 and r j (c, b) = 1 for all j ∈ N . From the argument above we know that r(a, c) ≥ r(a, b) and r j (a, c) ≥ r j (a, b) for all j ∈ N . However, an identical argument shows that r(a, b) ≥ r(a, c) and r j (a, b) ≥ r j (a, c) for all j ∈ N . Therefore, it must be the case that r(a, b) = r(a, c) and r j (a, b) = r j (a, c) for all j ∈ N . Since (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ H n is arbitrary, this condition holds for all proles (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ H n such that r j (b, c) = 1 and r j (c, b) = 1 for all j ∈ N .
Let F n denote the set of such proles. Take any prole ( r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ H n such that r j (a, b) = r j (a, c) for all j ∈ N . Then there exists a prole (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ F n such that r j (a, b) = r j (a, c) = r j (a, b) = r j (a, c) for all Case 3: (a, b), (c, b) ∈ X ×X. Take (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ H n such that r j (a, c) = 1 for all j ∈ N . U implies that r(a, c) = 1. Since r is max-star transitive, we have r(a, b) ≥ r(c, b). In addition, since r j (a, c) = 1 for all j ∈ N and individual preferences are max-star transitive, it follows that r j (a, b) ≥ r j (c, b) for all j ∈ N . Select a prole (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ H n such that r j (a, c) = 1 and r j (c, a) = 1 for all j ∈ N . From the argument above we know that r(a, b) ≥ r(c, b) and r j (a, b) ≥ r j (c, b) for all j ∈ N . However, an identical argument shows that r(c, b) ≥ r(a, b) and r j (c, b) ≥ r j (a, b) for all j ∈ N . Therefore, it must be the case that r(a, b) = r(c, b) and r j (a, b) = r j (c, b) for all j ∈ N . Since (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ H n is arbitrary, this condition holds for all proles (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ H n such that r j (a, c) = 1 and r j (c, a) = 1 for all j ∈ N .
Let G n denote the set of such proles. Take any prole ( r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ H 
n denote the set of such proles.
Then there exists a prole (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ J n such that r j (a,
Case 5: (a, b), (b, a) ∈ X × X. Take any prole (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ H n such that r j (a, b) = r j (a, c) = r j (b, c) = r j (b, a) for all j ∈ N . Cases (2) and (3) imply that r(a, b) = r(a, c) = r(b, c) = r(b, a). Let W n denote the set of such proles. Take any prole (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ H n such that r j (a, b) = r j (b, a) for all j ∈ N . Then there exists a prole (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ W n such that r j (a, b) =
Lemma 2. If has no zero divisor then any FAR satisfying I and U is dictatorial.
Proof. By the previous lemma, Φ is neutral. Let (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ H n denote a prole such that r i (a,
implies that r (a, b) = 1. Consider the following sequence of proles:
...
At some stage in this sequence, the social value of (a, b) rises from 0 to some number greater than 0. Without loss of generality, assume that this happens at R (2) when individual 2 changes his or her preferences from r(a, b)
to r (a, b). We prove that this individual is a dictator. First of all, consider a prole (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , .., r n ) ∈ H n . We claim that at this prole the social value of (a, b) is zero. To see this consider the prole (r * 1 , ..., r * n ) ∈ H n . At this prole, every individual's (a, c) preference is the same as their (a, b) preference at R (1) . Everyone's (a, b) preference is the same as their (a, b) preference at (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , .., r n ). Finally, everyone's (b, c) preference is the same as their (a, b) preference at R (2) .
Max-star transitivity implies r * (a, c) ≥ r * (a, b) r * (b, c). Since Φ is neutral, this means that 0 ≥ T (r * (a, b), α) where α > 0. If α = 1 then r * (a, b) = 0. If α < 1 then because T contains no zero divisor, r * (a, b) = 0. I implies that at (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , .., r n ) ∈ H n the social value of (a, b) is zero, which is what we wanted to demonstrate.
Note, however, that at this prole connectedness implies that r 2 (b, a) = 1 and also that the social value of (b, a) must be equal to 1. This is true irrespective of everyone else's (b, a) values. Neutrality therefore implies that for all (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ H n and for all (a, b) ∈ X × X, r 2 (a, b) = 1 implies r(a, b) = 1.
The proof can now be completed as follows. Take a prole (r 1 , . . . , r n ) ∈ H n such that r 2 (c, b) = r 2 (b, c) = 1, and r i (a, c) = r 2 (a, b) for all i ∈ N .
The other individuals can assign any value they choose to (a, b). Since is a triangular norm it must be the case that r(a, b) = r 2 (a, b). Again, neutrality implies that for all (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ H n and for all (a, b) ∈ X × X, r 2 (a, b) = r(a, b).
We now prove necessity. Before we do so, we note the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If is a triangular norm with a zero divisor, then there exists a zero divisor x such that T (x, x) = 0.
Proof. Assume, by way of contradiction, that no such divisor exists. Therefore, there exists x, y ∈ (0, 1) with x = y such that T (x, y) = 0. Without loss of generality assume that x > y. But then T (y, y) = 0 from the requirement that every triangular norm satises property (iii). This is a contradiction.
We now dene the following sets. Only two possibilities remain. Either (i) r(a, b) > x and r(b, c) ≤ x, or (ii) r(a, b) ≤ x and r(b, c) > x. Assume, without loss of generality, that (i) is true. Given that T satises property (iii), we know that r(a, b) x is greater than or equal to r(a, b) r(b, c). Therefore, given our earlier assumption that r(a, b) r(b, c) > r(a, c), it must be the case that r(a, b) x > r(a, c). We know by property (iv) that 1 x = x. Given that T satises property (iii) and r(a, b) ≤ 1, we have r(a, b) x ≤ x. Since we have r(a, b) x > r(a, c) and r(a, b) x ≤ x, it must be true that x > r(a, c). Returning again to the denition of Φ, note that x > r(a, c) implies r(a, c) = M (a, c). Note too that r(a, b) > x implies r(a, b) = m(a, b). We know then that for all i ∈ N , r i (a, b) ≥ r(a, b) and r i (a, c) ≤ r(a, c). 
